International Law and Arctic Shipping by Rothwell, Donald R.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARCTIC 
SHIPPING 
Donald R. Rothwell∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 67 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ARCTIC ............................ 70 
II. ARCTIC SHIPPING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ................ 73 
III. ARCTIC NAVIGATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ......... 78 
A. Northwest Passage ................................................... 81 
B. The Bering Strait ...................................................... 91 
1. Geographic Features .......................................... 92 
2. Bering Strait Maritime Boundary ...................... 93 
3. The Bering Strait and LOSC ............................. 94 
4. Recent Developments ........................................ 96 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................ 97 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Whilst the Arctic is often associated with being a hostile 
place for shipping, Arctic voyages of discovery are inextricably 
woven into the history of the Arctic and are especially associated 
with the major scientific expeditions of the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century.1 Nevertheless, whilst Arctic shipping has a 
long history, there has been a tendency to continually 
underestimate its significance due to the hostility of the Arctic 
environment and a view that the ice-covered Arctic Ocean was 
                                                          
∗Donald R. Rothwell, Professor of International Law, ANU College of 
Law, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia; PhD, University of 
Sydney; M.A., University of Calgary; LL.M., University of Alberta; BA/LLB., 
University of Queensland. This work builds on remarks delivered at Battle for 
the North: Is All Quiet on the Arctic Front? conference, Michigan State 
International Law Review symposium, Michigan State University College of 
Law, East Lansing, Michigan, USA, 21-22 February 2013; and at the “Arctic 
Law: The Challenges of Governance in the Changing Arctic” panel, 107th 
ASIL Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Washington, 
DC, USA, 5 April 2013.  
1 The history of the development of the Arctic, especially in North 
America, and the maritime dimension associated with Arctic expeditions and 
discovery is canvassed in SHELAGH D. GRANT, POLAR IMPERATIVE: A HISTORY 
OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY IN NORTH AMERICA (2011). 
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not suitable for traditional surface navigation. This prevailing 
view of the Arctic and shipping has in recent decades been 
challenged on two grounds. The first is that modern technology 
has given ships a much greater capacity to be able to operate in 
polar oceans if they possess ice-strengthened hulls, or are 
accompanied by nuclear-powered icebreakers.2 The second is 
that the previously impenetrable ice barrier of the Arctic Ocean 
is, due to the impacts of climate change, becoming thinner as a 
result of hard multi-year ice giving way in some parts of the 
Arctic to first-year ice, which is more prone to break-up during 
the summer, meaning that more open water is appearing across 
the Arctic.3 
The effect of these developments has been to give greater 
attention to shipping throughout the Arctic, the potential for 
Arctic shipping to continue to grow especially as the Arctic 
Ocean becomes more ice free, and ultimately the legal regime 
for the regulation of Arctic shipping.4 While historically the 
Northwest Passage has since the 1970s been the focal point of 
analysis with respect to Arctic navigational rights and freedoms 
vis-à-vis Canada and the United States in the North American 
Arctic,5 the Bering Strait is also beginning to gain attention.6 The 
importance of the Bering Strait to Arctic navigation was 
highlighted by the Arctic Council in its Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment 2009 Report (AMSA Report).7  This Report, which 
sought for the first time to comprehensively assess the status of 
                                                          
2 ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 
40 (2009) [hereinafter ARCTIC COUNCIL].   
3 These developments are generally outlined in Lawson W. Brigham, The 
Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic, 136 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. 54 (2010). 
4 See generally Tessa Mendez, Thin Ice, Shifting Geopolitics: The Legal 
Implications of Arctic Ice Melt, 38 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 527 (2010). 
5 See generally Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest 
Passage: A Final Revisit, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 3 (2007); Donald R. 
Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reassessment, 26 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 331 (1993). 
6 For discussion as to the increasing significance of the Bering Strait as 
an Arctic navigation route see generally Andrew Hartsig et al., Arctic 
Bottleneck: Protecting the Bering Strait Region from Increased Vessel Traffic, 
18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35 (2012); Donald R. Rothwell, International Straits 
and Trans-Arctic Navigation, 43 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 267 (2012). 
7 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2 at 106-09.   
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Arctic shipping, gave particular attention to Arctic navigational 
routes and not only considered the Northwest Passage and 
Northeast Passage (Northern Sea Route),8 but also the Bering 
Strait, and in particular considered a number of regional future 
scenarios.9 In this respect not only did the AMSA Report 
highlight the navigational and strategic importance of the Bering 
Strait, but also the role of the US in its ongoing regulation and 
management.10 
This focus in recent years upon Arctic shipping has also 
come at a time when Arctic governance has been the subject of 
much analysis as the Arctic Council has become more proactive 
in dealing with a range of Arctic issues and has begun to sponsor 
new Arctic agreements. During this period there has also been 
ongoing debate as to the adequacy of Arctic governance 
arrangements. Consideration has been given as to whether there 
is the need for an ‘Arctic Treaty’, not as a duplicate to the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty,11 but rather to provide a legal framework for 
the orderly development of a distinctive Arctic legal regime.12 It 
can truly be said that over the last decade the Arctic has become 
‘globalized’ as an issue area, and the governance debate is now 
between whether a regional response will be adequate or whether 
an internationalized response will be necessary. 
This article will address some of these issues with a specific 
focus upon international law and Arctic shipping. To begin, 
some brief observations will be made regarding international law 
in the Arctic. Detailed consideration will then be given to Arctic 
shipping and the international legal frameworks that regulate its 
operations. Next, further consideration will be given to Arctic 
navigation and international law and the particular issues that 
this has raised, especially for the United States in the Northwest 
Passage and the Bering Strait. Concluding remarks will then be 
                                                          
8 Id. at 112-19. 
9 Id. at 106-09. 
10 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 109. 
11 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 72. 
12 See generally David D. Caron, Toward an Environmental Regime, 24 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 377, 385-87 (1993); Donald R. Rothwell, The Arctic in 
International Affairs: Time for a New Regime? 15 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 241, 
248-51 (2008); Donald R. Rothwell, Polar Lessons for an Arctic Regime, 29 
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 55, 68-73 (1994). 
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made with an attempt to consider future issues for international 
law and Arctic shipping.  
 
 
 
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ARCTIC 
 
The Arctic as a region is not exempt from the application of 
general international law, whether it be customary international 
law or treaty. In that respect, international law applies in the 
Arctic in the same manner as it does elsewhere around the world, 
including in the other polar region, Antarctica.13 Nevertheless, 
there has been something of a view that some elements of 
international law could not apply in the Arctic because the region 
was generally inaccessible and the Arctic Ocean in particular, 
was ice-covered, thereby making it distinctive from the world’s 
other oceans to which the law of the sea generally applies.14 A 
further contrast was also drawn between the Arctic and 
Antarctica in that the southern polar region was the subject of its 
own distinctive regional treaty which had provided the 
foundation for the development of what has become known as 
the Antarctic Treaty System, which provides a distinctive 
regional legal regime for Antarctica whilst also interacting with 
the global international legal regime.15  
However as the Arctic has become more accessible, there 
has been an acceptance that international law has just as much a 
role in the region as it does elsewhere, with the law of the sea in 
particular assuming significance given how the Arctic Ocean 
dominates the region.16 In this respect, it needs to be recalled that 
the international law of the sea has been through a process of 
ongoing development since the seventeenth century and over the 
                                                          
13 The author’s discussion of this issue can be found outlined in more 
detail in DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-61, 219-220 (1996). 
14 See James Brown Scott, Arctic Exploration and International Law, 3 
AM. J. INT’L L. 928, 939 (1909).  
15 Davor Vidas, Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Interplay of 
Regulatory Frameworks, in PROTECTING THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT 3, 
6 (Davor Vidas ed., 2000). 
16 MICHAEL BYERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC, 4-9 (2013).  
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past 50 years has been codified in the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1958,17 and then in the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC).18 The LOSC, which entered into 
force in 1994, unquestionably creates a legal foundation for the 
regulation and management of the Arctic Ocean and its 
associated waters.19 With the exception of the United States, all 
of the Arctic littoral states are parties to the LOSC, and the US 
position is that it considers the LOSC to substantially reflect 
customary international law such that it adheres to its principal 
provisions.20 
The significance of the law of the sea for the Arctic is further 
reaffirmed by the May 2008 Ilulissat Declaration,21 which was 
issued by the five Arctic littoral states with interests over the 
Arctic Ocean: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the 
Russian Federation, and the USA.22 The Declaration is prefaced 
                                                          
17 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 
15 U.S.T. 606, 516 U.N.T.S. 206; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 
29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 
U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. 
18 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC]; see also DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM 
STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1-20 (2010) (assessing the 
development of the modern law of the sea). 
19 Louise Angélique de la Fayette, Oceans Governance in the Arctic, 23 
INT’L J.  MARINE & COASTAL L. 531, 532 (2008) (stating “[t]he . . . (LOSC) has 
established the international legal regime governing the division of ocean 
space, sovereign rights over ocean resources, protection of the marine 
environment and the conduct of activities in and under the Arctic Ocean.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
20 J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS  
639 (3rd ed. 2012).  
(The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations was 
developed to provide definitive guidance to U.S. operating forces. . . . It states 
that the [LOSC] codifies existing and emerging customary international law 
pertaining to navigation and overflight and, as such, is binding upon all U.S, 
forces operating in the maritime environment.). 
21 The Ilulissat Declaration, 48 I.L.M. 382 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter 
Ilulissat Declaration], available at  http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/ 
Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf. 
22 While Finland, Iceland, and Norway are also founding members of the 
Arctic Council, and as such partly comprise the “Arctic Eight,” alongside 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the USA, none of these 
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by acknowledging that the Arctic Ocean is at the threshold of 
significant change. Reference is made to climate change, melting 
of the ice, potential impacts upon vulnerable ecosystems, the 
livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and 
potential exploitation of natural resources. The littoral Arctic 
States note that by virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction in large areas of the Arctic Ocean, they are “in a 
unique position to address these possibilities and challenges.”23 
The Declaration observes that “an extensive international legal 
framework applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . ,”24 however no 
precise reference is made to any particular international 
instrument such as the LOSC. Nevertheless, the Declaration is 
very precise as to what it then has to say about the law of the sea, 
which is as follows: 
 
[T]he law of the sea provides for important rights and 
obligations concerning the delineation of the outer 
limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the 
marine environment, including ice-covered areas, 
freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, 
and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to 
this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of 
any possible overlapping claims.25 
 
Observing that  
 
[t]his framework provides a solid foundation for 
responsible management by the five coastal States 
and other users of this Ocean through national 
implementation and application of relevant 
provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a 
new comprehensive international legal regime to 
govern the Arctic Ocean.26  
 
                                                                                                                    
three states have coastlines washed by the Arctic Ocean proper, nor do they 
assert maritime claims into the central Arctic Ocean. BYERS, supra note 16, at 
92-93. 
23 Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 21, para. 1. 
24 Id. para. 3.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. para. 4. 
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The Declaration goes on to identify the need for measures to 
protect and preserve the Arctic Ocean marine environment, 
safety of life at sea, and closer cooperation on these and related 
Arctic Ocean issues.27 
Other than the law of the sea, the Arctic is also subject to a 
host of other general and specific international law, and those 
that particularly deal with shipping are noted in more detail 
below. As such, the relevant international law dealing with 
sovereign title over territory applies to the terrestrial areas of the 
Arctic and indeed was pivotal in resolving disputes between 
Denmark and Norway over the status of Greenland.28 Likewise, 
international human rights law also applies in the Arctic,29 as 
does international environmental law including the 1946 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which 
has specific relevance for many of the Arctic states.30 In 
summary, the Arctic is subject to the same body of international 
law as that which applies globally though given the nature of the 
region the law of the sea has more particular relevance than may 
be the case elsewhere.  
 
II. ARCTIC SHIPPING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The growth in Arctic shipping as outlined in the AMSA 
Report has increasingly shone the spotlight onto the legal 
regulatory framework for Arctic shipping. During the 1970s-
1990s, the attention given to this issue was nearly exclusively 
focused on the particular legal regimes that governed navigation 
through the Northwest Passage, and specifically the differing 
views of Canada and the United States over what legal regime 
                                                          
27 Id. paras. 5-6. 
28 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5). 
29 BYERS, supra note 16, at 218, 238-40. There is a developing literature 
with respect to the specific human rights issues confronting the Inuit in the 
Arctic. See Gudmundur Alfredsson, Arctic governance: Human Rights, Good 
Governance and Democracy, 4 Y.B. POLAR L. 141-153 (2012); see also Jessie 
Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights Approach to Climate Change for the 
Inuit?, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295, 297 (2009).  
30 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 
62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 74. 
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applied within those waters,31 and on the other hand the legal 
regulation by the USSR and Russian Federation of shipping 
through the Northern Sea Route.32 While the specific legal 
navigational regimes through those waters remain significant, 
recently increased attention has been given to broader issues 
associated with the legal regulation of Arctic shipping in the 
increasingly open waters of the Arctic Ocean.33 
In this respect it has been observed above that the LOSC 
creates the core legal framework for all activities associated with 
the Arctic maritime domain, and this certainly extends to include 
shipping. There are two central components to how the LOSC 
impacts upon the Arctic in this respect. The first is that the 
LOSC provides the basis for the assertion of the complete range 
of contemporary maritime zones commencing with the territorial 
sea (12 nautical miles),34 contiguous zone (24 nautical miles),35 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (200 nautical miles),36 and the 
continental shelf (200 nautical miles minimum with capacity for 
expansion to approximately 350 nautical miles).37 Conterminous 
with the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles are the high 
seas, which also exist beyond the limits of the EEZ.38 However, 
Article 58 of the LOSC notes that the freedoms of navigation 
                                                          
31 See, e.g., Donat Pharand, The Northwest Passage in International Law, 
17 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 99, 99 (1979); Ted L. McDorman, In the Wake of the 
Polar Sea Canadian Jurisdiction and the Northwest Passage, 10 MARINE 
POL’Y 243, 243-44 (1986). 
32 See generally R.D. BRUBAKER, THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC STRAITS (2005); 
ERIK FRANCKX, MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC: CANADIAN AND RUSSIAN 
PERSPECTIVES (1993) (discussing both of these issues).  
33 See generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2; Aldo Chircop, The 
Growth of International Shipping in the Arctic: Is a Regulatory Review 
Timely?, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 355 (2009); E.J. Molenaar, Arctic 
Marine Shipping: Overview of The International Legal Framework, Gaps, and 
Options, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L. L. & POL’Y. 289 (2009) (discussing the legal 
regulations of Arctic shipping). 
34 LOSC, supra note 18, art. 3. 
35 Id. art. 33. 
36 Id. art. 57. 
37 Id. art. 76. 
38 Id. art. 86 which is the first article found in Part VII of the LOSC and 
which provides: “The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are 
not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State . . .”.  
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and overflight referred to in Article 87 with respect to the high 
seas also apply within the EEZ.39 These various maritime zones 
give Arctic coastal states sovereignty over their adjacent 
territorial sea, and in some cases sovereign rights mixed with 
specific jurisdiction over, for example, the protection and 
management of the marine environment.40 The other significant 
dimension of the LOSC is that it provides for the recognition of 
navigational rights and freedoms for foreign shipping and this is 
particularly significant in the context of the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea,41 the right of transit passage 
through international straits,42 and the rights of high seas 
freedom of navigation over those areas of EEZ and continental 
shelf claimed by a coastal state subject to specific constraints 
that apply within those maritime areas.43 The consequence of 
these dual sets of measures under the LOSC is that Arctic littoral 
states have been able to claim a range of maritime zones under 
which they have been able to enjoy certain rights and privileges, 
while at the same time the international community and other 
Arctic states have an assurance that navigational rights and 
freedoms can continue to be exercised throughout the Arctic, or 
that in some instances these rights can actually be enjoyed for 
the very first time as a result of the effects of climate change and 
the opening of the region to greater shipping opportunities.  
The LOSC is not, however, a comprehensive legal 
framework for all shipping operations and is significantly 
supplemented by a separate body of international law dealing 
with ship-sourced marine pollution and another body of 
international maritime law that regulates a variety of aspects of 
                                                          
39 Id. art. 58 (2) which provides: “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent 
rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they 
are not incompatible with this Part.”  
40 Id. art. 234 (titled “Ice-covered areas” which gives to coastal states the 
capacity to adopt specific measures for the prevention, reduction and control of 
marine pollution from vessels in “ice-covered areas within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone”); see also D.M. McRae & D.J. Goundrey, 
Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: The Extent of Article 234, 16 U. 
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1982) (discussing article 234).  
41 LOSC, supra note 18, arts. 17-26. 
42 Id. arts. 37-44. 
43 Id. arts. 58, 87. 
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shipping operations. The 1973 International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),44 as amended 
by its 1978 Protocol, provides the core legal framework 
regulating ship-sourced marine pollution globally. MARPOL 
places significant limitations on ships discharging oil and 
noxious substances at sea, and also regulates sewage from ships, 
garbage from ships, and ship-sourced air pollution.45 The LOSC 
supplements these specific provisions with general mechanisms 
endorsing the MARPOL standards,46 including acknowledging 
the rights of coastal states to enact laws and regulations with 
respect to marine pollution from foreign ships within the 
territorial sea and EEZ.47 The 1974 International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as amended, is the current 
international legal instrument that regulates shipping operations 
at sea to ensure the safety of mariners.48 SOLAS establishes a 
series of operational standards for all shipping to ensure safety of 
life at sea. A related instrument is the 1978 Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping of 
Seafarers (STCW Convention) which is designed to ensure 
certification standards for crew at sea, which is also directed 
towards maintaining the safety of shipping.49 In recognition of 
the unique maritime conditions that prevail in the polar regions, 
over the course of the past decade an initiative has also been 
underway in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
develop a ‘Polar Code’ for shipping in polar waters that would 
encompass existing elements of the MARPOL, SOLAS and 
STCW, but also include specific provisions that reflect the 
additional challenges faced by polar shipping.50 This initiative 
                                                          
44 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
45 See id. annexes iv-vi. 
46 LOSC, supra note 18, art. 211. 
47 Id. arts. 21, 56(1)(b)(iii), 211. 
48 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 
1184 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter SOLAS]. 
49 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers, Dec. 1, 1978, 32 U.S.T. 5577, 1362 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter 
STCW]. 
50 Chircop, supra note 33, at 372-77. See also Andrea Scassola, An 
International Polar Code of Navigation: Consequences and Opportunities for 
the Arctic, 5 Y.B. POLAR L. (forthcoming 2013). 
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remains under development but there is an expectation that it 
will have a significant impact upon improving the overall quality 
of the regulation and management of Arctic shipping consistent 
with the existing international legal framework.51 
In addition to these particular legal instruments, there remain 
a number of other maritime conventions that will also apply to 
aspects of Arctic shipping, including: 
 
• 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs);52 
• 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London 
Convention);53 
• 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation (OPRC Convention).54 
 
Finally, it can be observed that the Arctic has in recent years 
witnessed the development of two new regional instruments, 
which have implications for shipping. In 2011, Arctic states 
concluded the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic SAR 
Agreement).55 The Agreement, concluded within the framework 
of the LOSC, is also directly designed to give effect to 
obligations upon the Arctic Council states found in the 1979 
                                                          
51 Laura Boone, International Regulation of Polar Shipping, in THE LAW 
OF THE SEA AND THE POLAR REGIONS: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GLOBAL AND 
REGIONAL REGIMES 193, 198-200 (Erik J. Molenaar, Alex G. Oude Elferink 
and Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2013). 
52 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter 
COLREG).  
53 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 
[hereinafter London Convention]. 
54 Id. See also Molenaar, supra note 33, at 309-13 (assessing the 
significance of additional instruments for Arctic shipping). 
55 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic, May 12, 2011, available at http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/ 
N813EN.pdf. 
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Search and Rescue Convention,56 and the 1944 Chicago 
Convention.57 While similar agreements exist either bilaterally or 
regionally for search and rescue purposes, this Agreement is 
particularly notable because it is the first regional legally binding 
instrument of its type in the Arctic. In 2013, the Arctic states 
were also able to reach agreement on an Arctic Marine Oil 
Pollution, Preparedness, and Response Agreement,58 which is 
designed to put in place more enhanced mechanisms to deal with 
marine environmental emergencies.  
 
III. ARCTIC NAVIGATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Within the framework of the LOSC, the most particular 
provisions of relevance as they relate to Arctic navigation are 
those that address the freedom of navigation for foreign flagged 
vessels as they pass through the territorial sea, international 
straits, the EEZ, and the high seas. Here the distinction under the 
law of the sea between foreign flagged vessels and vessels that 
are flagged to the littoral state is significant. Under national law, 
a littoral state can regulate as it pleases the movement of its own 
flagged vessels.59 This can be undertaken not only to achieve 
navigational safety, but also to regulate the fishing, trading, and 
marine transportation activities those vessels may be engaged in 
and such measures can be designed to achieve certain 
environmental objectives if some waters are considered to be 
particularly environmentally sensitive.60 With respect to foreign 
flagged vessels, however, the capacity of the littoral state to 
regulate the movement of such vessels in the territorial sea and 
waters that extend further out from the coastline is subject to the 
                                                          
56 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 
1979, T.I.A.S. 11093, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97. 
57 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Nov. 7, 1944, 61 U.S.T. 
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
58 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic, May 15, 2013, available at www.arctic-
council.org/eppr/agreement-on-cooperation-on-marine-oil-pollution-
preparedness-and-response-in-the-arctic.  
59 LOSC, supra note 18, arts. 91, 94.  
60 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 51-53. 
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international law of the sea as reflected in the LOSC.61 The 
general principles that apply to the movement of such vessels are 
that they enjoy the freedom of navigation, subject to certain 
overarching constraints.  
The principal legal navigational regime is that of innocent 
passage, which applies within the territorial sea. The right of 
innocent passage has a foundation in customary international 
law, the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zones, and is now provided for in the LOSC.62 Innocent passage 
provides for the freedom of navigation by foreign flagged 
vessels through the territorial sea of a coastal state provided that 
passage is continuous and expeditious and that the vessel does 
not engage in any activities that are prejudicial to the peace, 
good order, or security of the coastal state.63 While the right of 
innocent passage is significant for international shipping when 
seeking access to a port facility, the enjoyment of navigational 
rights and freedoms through international straits is more critical 
to the exercise of the freedom of navigation and has particular 
significance in the Arctic.  
Through the regime of innocent passage,64 and later the 
regime of transit passage,65 the law of the sea sought to 
accommodate the special circumstances of straits and their 
pivotal role as part of a maritime highway that connected 
adjoining oceans and high seas areas. The LOSC’s regime of 
straits used for international navigation can be traced back to the 
International Court of Justice’s 1949 decision in Corfu 
Channel.66 In the absence of a multilateral convention on the law 
of the sea or specific treaty dealing with the Corfu Channel, 
which is a body of water that separates the island of Corfu from 
the mainland of Albania and Greece in the southern part of the 
Adriatic Sea, the court was required to determine the status of 
these waters before assessing which legal regime applied.67 Here 
                                                          
61 LOSC, supra note 18, arts. 21, 42, 56, 58. 
62 See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 18, Ch. 10. 
63 LOSC, supra note 18, art. 19(1). 
64 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone arts. 14-23, 
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 206. 
65 LOSC, supra note 18, arts. 17-32. 
66 Corfu Channel case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. Reps 4, 4.   
67 Id. at 28-29. 
80 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
the court sought to develop a legal test so as to classify a 
particular body of water that had the characteristics of a strait 
and which was also used by international shipping.68 The court 
noted: “[i]n the opinion of the Court the decisive criterion is 
rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the 
high seas and the fact of its being used for international 
navigation.”69 The Court went on to observe that it was not 
“decisive” that the Corfu Channel was not a necessary route 
between two parts of the high seas, but only an alternative route 
of passage between the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. However, it 
noted that the Corfu Channel had nevertheless “been a useful 
route for international maritime traffic.”70  
The contemporary international law of the sea with respect 
to straits is found in Part III of the LOSC titled “Straits Used for 
International Navigation” and raises for consideration the 
characterisation of a strait used for international navigation.71 
The phrase suggests both a geographical and functional element. 
The geographical element relates to a strait being a body of 
water which lies between two areas of land, either continental 
land masses,72 a continent and an island,73 or two islands.74 The 
functional element is clearly drawn from Corfu Channel where 
the ICJ placed emphasis on the strait being one that was “used 
for international navigation . . . .”75 While there was no analysis 
in that case as to what volume of navigation through the strait 
would be required to meet the usage requirement, reference was 
made to the volume of navigation through the Strait between 
1936-1937, which assisted the Court in determining that the 
Corfu Channel had been “a useful route for international 
                                                          
68 Id. at 28. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 ROTHWELL, supra note 13, at 237-39. 
72 U.N. Office for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: BASELINES 50-51 (1989). An example is the Bering Strait separating 
continental Asia and North America.  
73 Id. The Dover Strait lies between the continent of Europe and an island 
comprising Great Britain.  
74 Id. The Cook Strait separates the North and South Island of New 
Zealand.  
75 Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 28. 
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maritime traffic.”76 Therefore, while this functional element 
remains a feature of the LOSC, it still remains unclear as to what 
level of international navigation is required for a strait to be 
appropriately classified as an ‘international strait’. Nevertheless, 
it is doubtful whether infrequent or irregular use of a strait would 
suffice to meet the functional criterion. Likewise, the strait must 
have been used by foreign flagged vessels and not only by 
through or cross-strait local vessel traffic. One matter in which 
the LOSC is silent is whether any distinction should be made 
between surface and sub-surface navigation of a strait. This has 
some particular relevance in the Arctic due to evidence of 
submarine navigation throughout the region, especially during 
the Cold War.77 However as the LOSC does not seek to 
distinguish between various types of navigation there is nothing 
in principle that would bar sub-surface submarine navigation 
from also being taken into account in determining whether the 
strait was used for that purpose.  
 
A. Northwest Passage78 
 
The Northwest Passage is a series of connected straits that 
weave through the islands that make up the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago.79 From the east, it allows shipping to pass from the 
North Atlantic up through Davis Strait through the archipelago 
and into the Beaufort Sea, which then provides access to the 
Chukchi Sea and the Bering Strait. While there are many 
potential navigation routes that in theory exist within the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago, the reality is that, historically, due 
                                                          
76 Id. 
77 See David W. Titley & Courtney C. St. John, Arctic Security 
Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Arctic Roadmap, in ARCTIC SECURITY IN 
AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 267, 274-75 (James Kraska ed., 2011); Katarzyna 
Zysk, Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural 
Resources, in ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 85, 91-94 
(James Kraska ed., 2011). See generally W. Harriet Critchley, Polar 
Deployment of Soviet Submarines, 39 INT’L. J. 828 (1984) (discussing incidents 
during the Cold War). 
78 The foundation of the analysis that follows is taken from ROTHWELL, 
supra note 13, at 191-200. 
79 BYERS, supra note 16, at 131.  
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to the presence of heavy ice and the shallow draught in some of 
the straits there have only been a handful of viable combinations 
of straits that allow for commercial shipping to pass through the 
Northwest Passage. Pharand has identified seven routes that have 
been used for transit of the Northwest Passage.80 
The status of the Northwest Passage as a shipping route had 
legally been relatively uncontroversial for much of the Twentieth 
century. This was primarily due to the lack of interest that had 
been shown by commercial navigation in the use of the Passage, 
and the challenges posed to such navigation by the ice 
conditions.81 While the US took an interest in the Northwest 
Passage during the early part of the Twentieth century, this was a 
lesser order issue compared to Arctic sovereignty more generally 
and ultimately the threat posed by the Soviet Union across the 
Arctic Ocean during the Cold War.82 This all changed in 1969 
with the voyage of the US-flagged SS Manhattan from the 
Beaufort Sea through the Northwest Passage to the Davis Strait. 
The Manhattan was an icebreaking supertanker carrying a small 
quantity of oil that was intentionally sent through the Northwest 
Passage by its US owners to demonstrate that such a vessel was 
capable of year-round sailings between Alaska and the US east 
coast.83 The voyage at that time was only the fifth recorded 
transit of the Northwest Passage, and the first since the end of 
World War II by a non-government vessel.84  
Despite the fact that there was a Canadian government 
official on board during the voyage, and that the Manhattan was 
accompanied by the Canadian Coast Guard vessel J.A. 
Macdonald,85 the voyage raised multiple issues for the Canadian 
government which extended to not only the legal regulation of 
the voyage of a foreign flagged vessel through some parts of the 
                                                          
80 Pharand, supra note 5, at 29-30; see also R.K. Headland, Ten Decades 
of Transits of the Northwest Passage, 33 POLAR GEOGRAPHY 1, 2, 11 (2010). 
81 Rothwell, supra note 13, at 192.  
82 GRANT, supra note 1, at 247-338. 
83 BYERS, supra note 16, at 134.  
84 See Pharand, supra note 4, at 31 (observing that the USCG ships 
Storis, Spar and Bramble (all icebreakers) each completed transits in 1957); see 
also T.C. Pullen, What Price Canadian Sovereignty?, 113 U.S. NAVAL INST. 
PROC. 66, 69-71 (1987) (discussing the voyage). 
85 Pullen, supra note 84, at 71. 
2013] International Law and Arctic Shipping 83 
 
Canadian territorial sea, but perhaps more significantly to the 
implications that the voyage had for the future development of 
the Northwest Passage as an international shipping route.86 
Ultimately it was the second proposed voyage of the Manhattan, 
scheduled to take place in 1970 and again accompanied by the 
J.A. Macdonald, that raised further public concerns about the 
status of the Northwest Passage and related fears about Canadian 
Arctic sovereignty which promoted a response from the 
Canadian government.87 The United States was perceived, 
rightly or wrongly, as ignoring Canadian sovereignty by these 
voyages through ‘Canadian waters’ and public pressure grew for 
the Canadian government to reaffirm Canada’s Arctic 
sovereignty and to ensure that any future voyages did not pose a 
threat to that sovereignty.88 In the wake of the Manhattan voyage 
the Canadian government led by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
adopted a number of measures including enactment of the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act,89 extension of the Canadian 
territorial sea from three to 12 nautical miles, and modification 
of Canada’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice so as to place a bar on any attempt 
by the United States to challenge Canada’s response before the 
court.90 
Canada’s actions, which took place prior to the 
commencement of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, were not welcomed by the US. The Department 
of State asserted that “[i]nternational law provides no basis for 
these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction[] on the high 
seas, and the [United States] can neither accept []or acquiesce in 
the assertion[s] of such jurisdiction.”91 Particular concern was 
                                                          
86 DONAT PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE ARCTIC WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO CANADA 55-57 (1973). 
87 TED L. MCDORMAN, SALT WATER NEIGHBORS: INTERNATIONAL OCEAN 
LAW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 70-4 (2009) 
88 See Maxwell Cohen, The Arctic and the National Interest, 26 INT’L. J. 
52, 67-68 (1970). 
89 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12 (Can.). 
90 Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, Apr. 7, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 598, 598-99. 
91 Canadian Practice in International Law During 1970 as Reflected 
Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of 
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raised as to the impact of these actions upon the freedom of 
navigation.92 
Further controversy arose over the status of the Northwest 
Passage between Canada and the US in 1985 when it was 
announced that the USCG Polar Sea would sail through the 
Passage from east to west as part of a repositioning of the vessel 
from Greenland to the US west coast.93 At the time the US 
Embassy in Ottawa informed the Canadian Department of 
External Affairs on 21 May 1985 of the proposed voyage but did 
not seek permission for the voyage to take place.94 It was 
observed in a demarche that “[t]he United States considers that 
this transit by the icebreaker Polar Sea will be an exercise of 
navigational rights and freedoms not requiring prior notification. 
The United States appreciates that Canada may not share this 
position.”95 
The US demarche was careful to state that an invitation to 
Canada for its officials to be “on-board participants” during the 
Polar Sea transit was not “inconsistent with its juridical 
position” and that Canadian “participation in the transit [would 
likewise] not . . . be inconsistent with its juridical position.”96 
Following a Canadian response on 11 June 1985 which made 
clear that the “waters of the Arctic Archipelago, including the 
Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada and fall within 
Canadian sovereignty,”97 the US responded on 24 June 1985 by 
observing that it “does not share this view” and made clear that 
while it was pleased to invite Canadian participation in the 
transit, “it has not sought the permission of the Government of 
Canada, nor has it given notification of the fact of the transit.”98 
At the time the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Joe 
                                                                                                                    
External Affairs, 9 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 276, 288 (J.A. Beesley & C.B. Bourne 
eds., 1971). 
92 Id. at 287-88; see also Marian Nash, Law of the Sea and International 
Waterways, 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT’L. L. 1981-1988, 
1728, 2042-44 (1994); ROACH & SMITH, supra note 20, at 319. 
93 BYERS, supra note 16, at 136. 
94 MCDORMAN, supra note 87, at 246-47.  
95 ROACH & SMITH, supra note 20, at 320. 
96 Id. at 321. 
97 Id. at 322. 
98 Id.; see also Nash, supra note 92, at 2044-49. 
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Clark, commented in the Canadian House of Commons that the 
voyage “‘does not compromise in any way the sovereignty of 
Canada over our northern waters, or affect the quite legitimate 
differences of views that exist between Canada and the United 
States on that question.’”99 The Polar Sea completed its transit 
of the Northwest Passage between 1-11 August 1985.100 
However, in September 1985 and following a comprehensive 
review of Canadian Arctic Policy, Clark announced to the 
Canadian Parliament a series of six new initiatives that were 
designed to clarify Canada’s legal position with respect to the 
region.101 These initiatives included the declaration of straight 
baselines around the islands that make up the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago, new legislation to enforce Canadian civil and 
criminal law in the waters enclosed within the baselines, and 
talks with the US on cooperation over Arctic waters.102 
Following the Polar Sea voyage, in 1988 Canada and the US 
concluded an Agreement on Arctic Cooperation.103 The 
Agreement focuses on the shared interest of both countries in 
research conducted during icebreaker navigation off their Arctic 
coasts and commits both governments to facilitating such 
navigation and to share research information arising from such 
voyages. However, the Agreement also touches upon Northwest 
Passage issues and directly alludes to this when in Article 3 it 
provides “[t]he Government of the United States pledges that all 
navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada 
to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the 
Government of Canada.”104 In the wake of Canada’s 1985 
baselines declaration, which enclosed the waters of the 
Northwest Passage within Canadian proclaimed baselines 
thereby making all of those waters internal waters,105 any US 
                                                          
99 20 June 1985, PARL. DEB., H.C. (1985) 6043 (Can.). 
100 ROACH & SMITH, supra note 20, at 323-24. 
101 10 Sept. 1985, PARL. DEB., H.C. (1985) 6463 (Can.). 
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103 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 
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icebreaker navigation through the Northwest Passage would pass 
through Canadian internal waters and be caught by the apparent 
obligations to request Canadian consent.106 However, as both 
Pharand and McDorman have separately noted the consent 
provision needs to be read in the context of how the 1988 
Agreement was framed, around cooperation for the purposes of 
research and that as there is no right under international law for 
foreign vessels to conduct research within internal waters of 
another state, the consent provision became necessary so as to 
acknowledge Canada’s core entitlement under international 
law.107 Even if the US had maintained that any transit of the 
Northwest Passage by its Coast Guard icebreakers was in fact an 
exercise of transit passage through an international strait, 
permission would still have been required to conduct research 
because marine scientific research is not a right that is enjoyed 
by foreign flagged vessels in transit passage.108 The 1988 
Agreement further sought to maintain the essential position of 
both parties with respect to their prior interpretations of the law 
of the sea when in Article 4 it was provided that “[n]othing in 
this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic 
neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the 
respective positions of the Governments of the United States and 
of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas 
or their respective positions regarding third parties.”109 At a 
Press Conference involving Canadian Minister for External 
Affairs, Joe Clark, and the US Secretary of State, George Shultz, 
that followed the conclusion of the Agreement, it was apparent 
that both governments were of the view that their positions 
regarding sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, and 
particularly the US position as to whether consent was required 
                                                                                                                    
outer limit of Canada’s historical internal waters.’ Subsequent government 
statements have followed this position. The consequence is that the straight 
baselines delineate the Arctic waters that are historic internal waters, rather 
than the normal consequence of straight baselines, which is the creation of 
internal waters.”). 
106 Id. at 237. 
107 Id. at 250; Pharand, supra note 4, at 39-40. 
108 LOSC, supra note 18, art. 40 (requiring foreign ships seek prior 
authorization to conduct marine scientific research during transit passage). 
109 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra note 103, art. 4. 
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for transit by US military vessels, had not changed as a result of 
the Agreement.110 
The first request by the US for an icebreaker transit 
conducted under the 1988 Agreement occurred in October 1988 
when consent was sought for transit of the USCG Polar Star.111 
In a Note from the US Embassy in Ottawa the US expressly 
sought the consent of the Government of Canada for the transit 
during which it was made clear that marine scientific research 
would be conducted.112 It was also made clear that the Polar Star 
would operate consistently with Canadian law, and a further 
offer was made that costs incurred from any discharge from the 
vessel would be the responsibility of the US in accordance with 
international law.113 Canadian consent was given for this transit, 
which was the first of five transits from 1988-2003.114 
Through their reliance upon the mechanism of the 1988 
Agreement, Canada and the US have effectively removed some 
of the public controversy that had been associated with the 1985 
Polar Sea Northwest Passage transit and the Canadian 
government’s response. However, formally the US government’s 
official position on the Northwest Passage remains unchanged. A 
joint National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)/Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) of January 9, 2009 titled 
“Arctic Region Policy”115 asserted that with respect to US 
National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic 
that “[f]reedom of the seas is a top national priority. The 
Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, 
and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international 
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage 
through those straits.”116 
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4, at 39-40; Nash, supra note 92, at 2049-52. 
111 ROACH & SMITH, supra note 20, at 325-26. 
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More recently, the Obama Administration released the 2013 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region,117 which focuses 
attention upon advancing US security interests in the Arctic, 
developing “Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship,” and 
strengthening international cooperation.118 The Strategy 
acknowledges the changing conditions in the Arctic, including 
that the Arctic Ocean is becoming more navigable, which is 
increasing interest in the Northwest Passage.119 Under the 
general heading of the advancing US security interests it 
acknowledges that the US will seek to: 
 
Preserve Arctic Region Freedom of the Seas – The 
United States has a national interest in preserving all 
of the rights, freedoms and uses of the sea and 
airspace recognized under international law. We will 
enable prosperity and safe transit by developing and 
maintaining sea, under-sea, and air assets and 
necessary infrastructure. . . . Existing international 
law provides a comprehensive set of rules governing 
the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s oceans 
and airspace, including the Arctic. The law 
recognizes these rights, freedoms, and uses for 
commercial and military vessels and aircraft. . . . We 
will also encourage other nations to adhere to 
internationally accepted principles.120 
 
The Strategy goes on to identify “Guiding Principles” which 
are stated to include “international legal principles of freedom of 
navigation . . . and other uses of the sea and airspace related to 
these freedoms, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the peaceful 
resolution of disputes.”121 
This analysis would suggest that the US position on the 
Northwest Passage remains unchanged. McDorman’s 2009 
assessment of the situation therefore remains apt: 
                                                          
117 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION 
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The 1988 Agreement, however, was a political fix and 
not a legal fix to accommodate Canada while not 
undermining the U.S. legal position. It is an important 
and instructive example of the cooperative approach 
that Canada and the United States frequently are able 
to pursue to circumvent international ocean law 
disputes.122 
 
One of the pivotal legal issues that arises in any analysis of 
the status of the Northwest Passage is whether it is possible to 
equate it with a single strait, or whether it is appropriate to 
characterize it as a series of interconnected straits. In this regard, 
the Northwest Passage could be considered unique as both 
customary international law and the LOSC has focused on the 
situation of a single strait, and not a series of straits that in sum 
comprise a navigational route from one area of the high 
seas/EEZ to another. Nevertheless it is not contested that the 
Northwest Passage meets the geographic requirement of a strait 
or a series of straits as reflected in decisions, such as the Corfu 
Channel case, in treaty law such as the LOSC or in customary 
international law.123 
The most significant requirement, and one that has been the 
principal point of contention between Canada and the US, is the 
functional requirement referred to in Corfu Channel that the 
strait actually be used for international navigation. Pharand’s 
view has been that because of the low number of recorded 
transits of the strait it would not be possible to classify the 
Northwest Passage as a strait “used for international 
navigation”.124 This clearly raises issues as to the actual recorded 
number of transits that have taken place, whether distinctions 
should be made between historical figures and more 
contemporary assessments, and the percentage of transits 
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completed by non-Canadian flagged vessels.125 Pharand 
identified 15 transits of the Northwest Passage by US flagged 
vessels between 1903-2005, of which only two were by non-
government vessels – the Manhattan (1969) and an adventure 
yacht, the Belvedere (1983-1988).126 More recent figures have 
indicated 18 transits of the Northwest Passage during the 
summer of 2010,127 while Headland has identified 135 full 
transits of the Northwest Passage in the period 1903-2009.128 
Relying upon the actual use of the Northwest Passage since the 
first successful navigation, Pharand has maintained that the 
Passage is not an international strait.129 He has argued that those 
who contend otherwise confuse potential use with actual use and 
that mere capacity is not what is required but rather actual use.130 
Nevertheless, two respected US scholars with close links to the 
US Department of State observed in 2012 that on the basis of the 
statistics on usage of the strait that “to deny, as Canada continues 
to do, that the Northwest Passage is not a strait used for 
international navigation . . . is simply not credible.”131 The US as 
recently as May 2013 has reasserted its position that it enjoys the 
freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage.132 The 
disagreement between Canada and the US over the status of the 
Northwest Passage remains therefore a live issue. In recent 
decades both countries have reached an understanding regarding 
their respective positions, however as the Northwest Passage 
becomes increasingly ice free during the summer a point may 
                                                          
125 From the time of the very first transit of the Passage in 1903-1906 by 
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eventually be reached where if the US wishes to assert its 
position regarding the freedom of navigation it may need to take 
a more robust position if it wishes to have its view upheld.  
 
B. Bering Strait133 
 
The Bering Strait is perhaps the most strategically located of 
the current Arctic ‘choke points’ given its location at the 
northern limit of the Pacific Ocean, and the direct access that it 
provides between the Bering Sea and Chukchi Sea into the 
Arctic Ocean. Given the increase in Arctic shipping, especially 
along the Northern Sea Route, the Bering Strait’s significance to 
Arctic navigation will only continue to increase in the future, 
especially due to its proximity to major trading powers, such as 
China, Japan, and South Korea.134 The Bering Strait will also be 
important if the Northwest Passage becomes a major Arctic 
navigation route because of the access that it provides to the 
Beaufort Sea for ships that are navigating west to east along the 
Northwest Passage en route to the US east coast and the Atlantic 
Ocean. The presence of six commercial ports within the Bering 
Strait region – three American and three Russian – located to the 
south of the Strait further emphasise the current and future 
commercial capability for shipping through the region.135 The 
Bering Strait is also recognised by the US Department of 
Defense for its strategic importance, with a May 2011 
Departmental publication acknowledging that “[a]n increase in 
maritime traffic between Asia and Europe, or Russia, could also 
raise the prominence of the Bering Strait as a strategic 
chokepoint and heighten the geostrategic importance of the 
Arctic region.”136 
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1. Geographic Features 
 
The Bering Strait is bordered by Russia to the west and the 
United States (Alaska) to the east and is approximately 51 miles 
wide. The northern approach through the Chukchi Sea is 
relatively wide before it gradually narrows on approach to the 
strait, while the southern approach has the Aleutian Islands 
(United States) as a barrier to the east. High seas navigation 
through the central Bering Sea presents no difficulties until St. 
Lawrence Island (United States) is reached immediately to the 
south of the strait proper. St. Lawrence Island straddles the 
southern entrance to the Bering Strait forcing shipping to route to 
the east or to the west between the island and the Russian 
mainland. The distance between the southeast point of Cape 
Chukoski (Russia) and Northwest Cape on St. Lawrence Island 
is approximately 38 nm, while the Alaskan mainland is 
approximately 124nm at its closest point, allowing for navigation 
via a high sea corridor on either side of St. Lawrence Island 
before the Bering Strait is entered. 
At the mid-point of the strait there are two islands - Big 
Diomede (Russia) and Little Diomede (United States) - 
effectively creating three navigational channels:  
 
• Bering Strait – West: which lies between the Russian 
mainland and Big Diomede Island approximately 22.5 
miles wide; 
• Bering Strait – East: which lies between the US 
mainland and Little Diomede Island approximately 22.5 
miles wide; and 
• The Diomede channel:137 which is a 2.4 nm channel 
separating Big Diomede and Little Diomede Islands.138 
 
                                                          
137 There does not appear to be an official name for the body of water that 
separates the two islands, other than that the waters fall within the Bering 
Strait, accordingly for this article it is referred to as the ‘Diomede channel’. 
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Bering Strait – East and Bering Strait – West are recognised by 
the US Navy as international straits for the purposes of the 
LOSC.139 
 
2. Bering Strait Maritime Boundary 
 
The Bering Strait is the subject of a maritime boundary 
delimitation agreement between Russia and the United States, 
which extends in the south from the Bering Sea, through the 
Strait, into the Chukchi Sea. The 1990 Agreement between the 
United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Maritime Boundary140 has as its principal focus 
the delimitation of the respective EEZ and continental shelf areas 
within the region and at approximately 1600 nm in length is one 
of the longest maritime boundaries in the world.141 The 1990 
Agreement mirrors some of the principal provisions embedded in 
the 1867 Convention ceding Alaska between Russia and the 
United States,142 the effect of which is that Articles 1 and 2 of 
the 1990 Agreement recognise the maritime boundary through 
the middle of the Bering Strait, and accordingly reflects the 
relative positions on either side of the boundary of Big Diomede 
and Little Diomede.143  
While the 1990 Agreement makes no express reference to 
navigational rights and freedoms in the Bering Strait, there is 
clear recognition that while the maritime boundary places limits 
upon the extent of coastal state jurisdiction,144 in all other 
                                                          
139 Annotated Supplement to The Commanders Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations, 73 INT’L LEGAL STUD. 205 (A.R. Thomas & James C. 
Duncan eds., 1999). 
140 Agreement on the Maritime Boundary, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Jun. 1, 1990, 29 
I.L.M. 941 (1990) [hereinafter America-USSR Maritime Boundary]. 
141 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 447 (Jonathan I. Charney & 
Lewis M. Alexander eds., vol. 1 1993). 
142 Convention Ceding Alaska, U.S.-Russ., Mar. 30, 1867, 134 
CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 331 [hereinafter 1867 Convention]. 
143 Id. art. 1-2. This part of the 1867 Convention also provided for the 
boundary between St. Lawrence Island and the Russian mainland, which passes 
through a midway point between the island and Cape Chukotski (Russia). 
Charney & Alexander, supra note 141, at 450-451. 
144 See Maritime Boundary Agreement, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. 1, ¶ 2, June 1, 
1990, 1990 U.S.T. LEXIS 234. 
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respects the boundary does “not affect or prejudice” the rights of 
either state “with respect to . . . the exercise of sovereignty, 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction with respect to the waters” of the 
area.145 It is clear therefore that other than the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary through the Bering Strait, the 1990 
Agreement has no direct impact upon the navigational regime, 
which applies within those waters. The 1990 Agreement has not 
been ratified by Russia, yet has been provisionally applied since 
15 June 1990.146 
 
3. The Bering Strait and the LOSC 
 
The Bering Strait meets all of the geographic requirements 
of a strait for the purposes of Part III of the LOSC in that it is a 
body of water that connects one part of the EEZ/High Seas 
(Bering Sea) with another part of the EEZ/High Sea (Chukchi 
Sea). That technically there may exist three geographic straits 
within the body of water known as the Bering Strait (Bering 
Strait – East; Bering Strait – West and the Diomede channel) is 
irrelevant for the purposes of the LOSC, and there are many 
other international straits throughout the world which are formed 
by two opposite land masses within which they may be scattered 
small islands.147 Whether the Bering Strait is one used for 
“international navigation” in the Corfu Channel sense may have 
been contestable in the past, but it would appear clear on the 
basis of current usage that the strait is certainly considered useful 
for international navigation. For example, the 2009 AMSA 
Report noted that “150 large commercial vessels pass through 
the Bering Strait during the July-October open water period, with 
transits of these vessels most frequent at the beginning (spring) 
and end of the period (autumn).”148 While some caution needs to 
be exercised because of the usage of the strait by previously 
Soviet and currently Russian flagged shipping, it is clear that on 
current and future projections the strait will be used by many 
                                                          
145 Id. art. 4. 
146 Charney & Alexander, supra note 141, at 452. 
147 Torres Strait (Australia/Papua New Guinea), and Singapore Strait 
(Singapore/Indonesia) are significant examples. 
148 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 109. 
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ships, other than those which are Russian or US flagged.149 On 
that basis, the Bering Strait would meet the requirements for an 
international strait under Part III of LOSC to which the regime of 
transit passage applies.150 
A somewhat unique feature of the Bering Strait is that 
international shipping has effectively two viable routes through 
the Strait: the “Russian route” to the west of the Diomede Islands 
and through the Russian territorial sea; and the “American route” 
to the east of the Diomede Islands and through the US territorial 
sea. The Diomede channel, at only 2.4 nm does not appear to be 
wide enough when compared to the alternate routes to be 
attractive to commercial shipping. There is also the dimension 
that the waters between the islands fall within the Russia/US 
maritime boundary with the effect that shipping would be subject 
to both Russian and US law at different times as they completed 
their transit. 
In principle the existence of alternate American and Russian 
routes through the strait does not raise any significant 
international law issues given that the LOSC creates a set of 
standards which are equally applicable to each route and which 
are not dependent on the strait being a “one state” or “two state” 
strait.151 It does, however, highlight the fact that the United 
States has yet to become a party to the LOSC, and whilst US 
state practice has been to consistently adhere to the transit 
passage regime and effectively accept its status as part of 
customary international law,152 it still does raise the potential for 
                                                          
149 See id. 
150 LOSC, supra note 18, pt. 3. The view is also endorsed by the AMSA 
Report, which states that “[t]he Bering Strait region is an international strait for 
navigation and a natural chokepoint for marine traffic in and out of the Arctic 
Ocean from the Pacific Ocean.” ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 109. For 
further discussion of maritime traffic in the Bering Strait see Hartsig, supra 
note 6, 46-47, 49-52. 
151 LOSC, supra note 18, arts. 37-44. 
152 See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777, 419 (Dec. 27,1988) 
(“[I]n accordance with international law, as reflected in the applicable 
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with 
the territorial sea of the United States, . . . the ships and aircraft of all countries 
enjoy the right of transit passage through international straits.”). See generally 
ROACH & SMITH, supra note 20, at 271-275 (describing shipping lanes in the 
Arctic). 
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slight variations in state practice in the interpretation of transit 
passage on either side of the strait. It also raises the prospect of 
differing laws and regulations being applicable within either the 
Russian or US side of the strait, once again consistent with 
Article 42 of the LOSC, though such laws are to be non-
discriminatory and to not deny, hamper or impair the right of 
passage.153 Given the environmental sensitivity associated with 
all aspects of Arctic shipping, some consideration may in due 
course be given to the establishment of sea lanes and a traffic 
separation scheme through the Bering Strait so as facilitate “one 
way” north-south and south-north traffic on either side of the 
Diomede Islands. Such measures would be consistent with 
Article 41 of the LOSC, but would require cooperation between 
Russia and the United States in referring such a proposal to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) for adoption.154 The 
2009 AMSA Report noted there were no vessel routing measures 
within the Bering Strait and few aids to navigation.155 Given the 
significant potential of this strait for increased maritime traffic 
and the difficult navigational conditions, it would be anticipated 
that in due course such arrangements will be put in place.156  
 
4. Recent Developments 
 
In 2012, the Alaska Legislature in a report into Alaska’s 
Northern Waters recommended that the US seek to work within 
the IMO for the establishment of a Bering Strait Vessel Traffic 
Separation Scheme in which it was commented that: 
 
This remote, narrow, and hazardous international 
strait is located in an environmentally sensitive area 
with little or no search and rescue or maritime-
disaster response capability within 800 miles. 
                                                          
153 LOSC, supra note 18, art. 42 (2). LOSC article 42(2) provides: “Such 
laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact among foreign 
ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying, hampering or 
impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this section.” Id. 
154 ROACH & SMITH, supra note 20, at 480. 
155 ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 109. 
156 See generally ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 109 (describing 
potential for Bering Sea shipping lanes). 
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Increased vessel traffic in the future will make this 
area particularly vulnerable to maritime disasters. It 
is only prudent that basic routing measures and 
vessel monitoring systems be put in place to reduce 
the risk of calamity in the Bering Strait.157 
 
In response to these developments and the increased 
attention given to maritime traffic in the Bering Strait, in 2010 
the US Coast Guard commenced a “Port Access Route Study” in 
order to assess whether there was a need to create new vessel 
routing measures in the Bering Strait. While the area under 
review only encompasses US waters in the strait, the Coast 
Guard study does have the potential to facilitate appropriate 
bilateral arrangements with Russia if those are deemed 
appropriate.158 In a further sign that the US and Russia are giving 
attention to their shared interests in the Bering Strait region, in 
2012 it was announced that the two neighbours would 
commence negotiations towards the finalization of 
“Transboundary Area of Shared Beringian Heritage” that would 
link the National Parks in Alaska and Russia.159 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the past decade the Arctic has moved from the far recesses 
of international affairs to the mainstream. Debates have emerged 
as to the geopolitical importance of the region,160 its governance, 
                                                          
157 ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE ALASKA NORTHERN WATERS TASK FORCE 15 (2012), available at 
housemajority.org/coms/anw/pdfs/27/NWTF_Full_Report_Color.pdf. 
158 Cf. Port Access Route Study: In the Bering Strait, 75 Fed. Reg. 215 
(Nov. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 167). See also Hartsig, supra 
note 6, at 61-62. 
159 Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet U.S.-Russia Cooperation on 
Antarctica, Interregional Areas, and Beringia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
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160 See generally Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic 
and Security Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 63 (2008) 
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and its economic future.161 The Arctic has also emerged as the 
yardstick against which climate change is increasingly measured. 
In that respect particular attention has been paid to the 
disappearance of the Arctic ice cap, and its impact for the central 
Arctic Ocean with respect to trans-Arctic shipping and coastal 
shipping.162 These developments have focused attention upon the 
legal regime in the Arctic, and especially that with respect to the 
maritime Arctic as this is where the region is seen as having 
immediate potential as new shipping routes are opened in 
response to regional and global trading demands. However, far 
from being unregulated the reality is that there already exists a 
significant body of international law dealing with Arctic 
shipping. The relevant international law, principally founded 
upon the international law of the sea, has not recently emerged, 
but rather has been developed over many centuries and as 
embodied in the LOSC represents the culmination of developed 
state practice, decisions of international courts, and prior treaties. 
The foundational law of the sea principles are supported by a 
number of parallel conventional regimes dealing with marine 
pollution, safety of life at sea, and shipping regulatory standards. 
Yet, this body of international law is not static, and remains 
under development through initiatives such as the proposed Polar 
Code.  
With the LOSC at the centre of the Arctic shipping legal 
regime, two critical issues have emerged in recent years. The 
first is that whilst the United States has not formally adopted the 
LOSC by way of accession, it maintains the position that it 
adheres to the Convention and seeks to uphold its obligations 
whilst also enjoying its rights. In this respect the United States 
position vis-à-vis the Northwest Passage, where it asserts certain 
rights, and the Bering Strait, where it acknowledges its 
obligations, highlights the position faced by the United States 
with respect to the law of the sea and these pivotal Arctic 
shipping routes. The second is that by accepting the Arctic 
                                                          
161 The Melting North, THE ECONOMIST (SPECIAL REPORT: THE ARCTIC), 
June 16, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21556798. 
162 See Andrew E. Kramer, Polar Thaw Opens Shortcut for Russian Gas; 
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Ocean is also subject to the same navigational rights and 
freedoms for shipping as other oceans, it follows that these are 
rights which can be enjoyed by the ships of all states. This means 
that states that have not traditionally had a strong Arctic presence 
will be able to enjoy navigational rights and freedoms 
throughout the Arctic. In particular, states such as China, Japan 
and South Korea will all be able to gain access to Arctic shipping 
routes and enjoy recognized freedoms of navigation. Ultimately, 
however, these are geopolitical issues. What can be confidently 
asserted is that the international law with respect to Arctic 
shipping is well developed and sufficiently robust to be able to 
withstand whatever testing times it may be facing.  
